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Abstract Law enforcement authorities (LEAs) have begun using artificial intelli-
gence and predictive policing applications that are likely to raise ethical, data protec-
tion, social, political and economic issues. This paper describes application of a new
scenario methodology for identifying issues that emerging technologies are likely
to raise in a future six or seven years hence, but that deserve policymakers’ atten-
tion now. It often takes policymakers that long to develop a new policy, consult
with stakeholders and implement the policy. Thus, policymakers need a structured,
but concise framework in order to understand the issues and their various impli-
cations. At the same time, they also prefer policies that have stakeholder support.
These considerations led the University of Twente in the Netherlands and the UK’s
Trilateral Research to develop the scenario that follows. It is structured with several
headings that policymakers need to consider in order to move toward a desired future
and avoidance of an undesired future.
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1 Introduction
Law enforcement authorities (LEAs) have begun using artificial intelligence and
predictive policing applications that are likely to raise ethical, data protection, social,
political and economic issues. What issues should policymakers be considering now
in relation to such emerging technologies in order to be prepared for a future six or
seven years hence, which can be assumed the time policymakers need to develop
a policy addressing those issues (or, at least, some of them), to build support for it
and to get their political masters to sponsor relevant legislation or regulation? That
question impelled the development of the scenario detailed in the following pages.
The University of Twente in the Netherlands and the UK’s Trilateral Research led
the development of the scenario, which kicked off with a brainstorming workshop of
23 invited stakeholders. The partners drafted a scenario based on that brainstorming
session, which they then sent to the workshop participants for comments. With those
comments, the partners created a second iteration of the scenario, which they then
sent to the SHERPA project1 stakeholder board (27 experts) for their comments,
whose comments, in turn, led to the third iteration of the scenario. The partners
then invited the project’s contact list of more than 1,000 people to comment on
the scenario. The partners then posted the scenario on the project’s website and
invited visitors to comment on the scenario. In due course, the SHERPA project co-
ordinator submitted the scenario to the European Commission. Hence, the scenario
was not simply a mechanism to provide structured advice to policymakers, but also a
process for engaging increasing numbers of stakeholders, a process intended to lend
credibility and legitimacy to the scenario and in particular to its recommendations.
There were several good reasons for involving as many stakeholders as possible
in the scenario construction process, which included the following. The involvement
of stakeholders facilitated a participatory, deliberative approach to policy-making.
It was also important because it helped to uncover issues that might otherwise be
overlooked. Further, the involvement of various stakeholders was ideal for exploring
possible consequences of current trends in smart information systems (the combina-
tion of AI and BigData), considering desired and undesired futures as a result of such
a combination. Furthermore, the stakeholder involvement helped decision-makers in
the decision-making process aimed at determining what steps should be taken to
reach the desired future and avoid an undesired future.
The partners aimed to develop a plausible scenario six or seven years from the
initial brainstorming workshop (held in late 2018) to provide an early warning about
how the use of AI and big data is likely to develop and inform policy [12]. The agreed
timeframe was seven years up to 2025, as it was sufficiently distant to merit some
speculation, but not so distant that the project could indulge in science fiction. The
wish was to create a plausible scenario that reflected the emergence of advanced
technologies yet was sufficiently grounded that it could be justifiably used to tease
out the ethical and human rights issues for policymakers and other stakeholders.
1See the last section of this chapter for more information about SHERPA, a 42-month, EU-funded
project that began in May 2018.
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The brainstorming session followed a structured agenda which is reflected in
the section headings in the scenario below. The partners structured the scenario to
be of optimum use to policymakers, and it addresses the questions policymakers
would be expected to ask or be asked by their constituents. The authors describe the
scenario as a “policy scenario” because it has been developed for policymakers and
addresses the issues they would need to address before submitting a policy proposal
to their government ministers. The policy scenario methodology has been described
elsewhere.2
2 The Scenario
In 2025, many police forces across Europe are adopting predictive policing technolo-
gies in response to cuts in human resource budgets. Such cuts inevitably led to a rise
in crime rates. Many LEAs began experimenting with different predictive policing
technologies as a way of cutting crime before it happens. After some false starts, such
technologies have evolved as remarkably as facial recognition technologies. Smart
information systems, notably artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms, are within the
reach of all European LEAs, who now can feed such systems with the vast swathes
of data to which they have access. In a manner that is both intelligent and provides
useful information in real-time, law enforcement authorities (LEAs) have been exper-
imenting with different applications. Some of these have been developed in-house by
the national forces, some have been developed through the European Commission’s
Horizon Europe research programme, but many are the result of collaborations with
private sector players. In some cases, these private initiatives include or result in
proprietary data of benefit to the private sector partners.
As one would expect, some approaches and technologies for predictive policing
have proven to be better than others. The intelligence-led policing approaches trialled
by Pol-Intel in Denmark [1] have served as models of police access to and use of
many disparate data sets. The more ambitious applications go beyond accessing data
to using those data to make predictions regarding incidents of future crime. Most
predictive policing applications have drawn on location-based data to define increas-
ingly localised “hot spots” on which the police should focus attention at particular
times, while others draw on personal data to identify likely offenders [6]. Other appli-
cations aim to predict likely victims of crime in cases such as domestic violence,
or those at risk of becoming offenders in the future. Still other predictive policing
applications have turned their attention from visible street crime to the less visible
white-collar crimes, includingmoney-laundering, tax evasion, fraud and cybercrime.
Some researchers are using these technologies to draw together demographic, census
and other social data to determine what factors are most likely to induce someone to
2Wright, David, Bernd Stahl and Tally Hatzakis, “Policy scenarios as an instrument for policymak-
ers”, Technological Forecasting & Social Change, Vol. 154, May 2020. https://www.sciencedirect.
com/journal/technological-forecasting-and-social-change/vol/154/suppl/C.
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commit a crime. The answers to such questions are expected to make possible early,
large-scale interventions where communities and individuals are at risk.
Predictive policing applications must have measurable success factors. Typically,
this is amatter of rising or falling reports of crime, but this is an unstablemetric. At its
heart is a mere correlation and does not prove a causal link between the application
and the number of reports. Hence, a decline in reported crime might have come
about through using the application, but it might equally be a result of demographic
changes. It is possible that reliance on the application has reduced the efficacy of
police responses such that many no longer bother reporting crimes as they know
that they won’t be acted upon. Equally, some applications have been reported as
helping the police determine which crimes are worth a response. In some areas,
thanks to local press reporting, it is widely known that burglaries will usually not
merit a response, and so actual burglaries have increased in number while the number
of reports of burglary has declined. On the other hand, the applications may be so
successful that police are effectively anticipating crimes and arriving in time to deter
the potential criminal from carrying through with their plans. This is plausible given
efforts to streamline the online reporting process, itself aided by data analytics and
AI, allowing for a smooth and fast process for victims or others to report crimes.
While some of the public feared a move to “Minority Report” policing, in which
a computer informs police who is about to commit a crime and then that person is
arrested moments before the act, this has not happened [11]. Indeed, the police are
adamant that any computer prediction regarding likely crime hot spots or offenders
are fed as information to a team of analysts who then combine that with other infor-
mation before advising patrols. This prevents policing by algorithm from becoming
the norm. However, cuts in police funding have reduced the number of available
analysts, and the remaining analysts have been noticing that the number of false
positives (indications that a crime will occur in an area where no crime takes place)
is falling with each year, and worry for the future of their jobs. In 2020, for example,
there was only one information analyst working for the whole of the LA Police
Department.
Furthermore, budget cuts have pushed many officers with good local knowledge
into early retirement. New officers, lacking this knowledge, have come to rely upon
the predictive policing system. This has led to fears of automation bias in which
officers trust the system despite evidence to the contrary [3, 10], and despite the
training, introduced in 2020, to rectify this [4]. Nonetheless, there remains a tension
as to how best to act when the system recommends one course of action and the
officer disagrees with this recommendation, leading to some complaining that they
are being treated like robots.
International comparisons do not end with the numbers of analysts. Many cities in
the United States have been aggressive in pursuing predictive policing, particularly
after funding to this endwas increased shortly after theUS 2020 presidential election.
Incarcerations have increased, but there is no sign of a change in the demographic
composition of the prison population, which is overwhelmingly African-American.
China has also been aggressive in developing predictive technologies following the
widespread integration of the Social Credit System which incorporates all data on
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a person, including bank records, medical records and educational attainments [2].
Facial recognition on CCTV is now standard in most Chinese cities, although there is
insufficient recognition by the Chinese authorities of the problem of false positives.
The general approach is one of “better safe than sorry”, leading again to a suspected
(albeit unreported) rise in the prison population. Owing to Chinese information-
sharing protocols, it is also not certain what the ethnic composition of that population
looks like, but there are reports that some communities such as the Uighurs have been
all but decimated in recent years as they are arrested on the basis of a likelihood of
committing a crime [7]. Finally, efforts at introducing predictive policing in some
South American cities, such as Bogota in Colombia, have exacerbated perceived
biases as the focus remains on preventing crimes against the wealthy, while police
ignore victims from less affluent areas.
Europe has been slower than China and the US in adopting predictive policing
technologies, partly owing to the human rights frameworks such as the European
Charter for Fundamental Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights,
both of which are backed up by laws such as the General Data Protection Regulation,
which is seen as an effective means of regulating the use of personal data across
society. This regulatory framework has combined with the Horizon Europe research
programme, begun in 2020, which continued to focus funding on counter-terrorism
efforts, which in turn skewed investment in policing and predictive analytics towards
identifying factors in radicalisation and away from more common crimes and even
farther away from white-collar crime.
While there has been investment in police use of these technologies, criminals have
not been idle. LEA cyber detectives have uncovered applications used by criminal
gangs to predict where the police will be at any time of the day or night, often drawing
on the same data sets used by the police, made public in the name of transparency
and democratic accountability. Others have been found on the dark net offering
significant sums to hackers who can reverse-engineer police systems to indicate
which parameters are used to predict crimes in order that they can better avoid
detection.
The police find themselves caught between a rock and a hard place. The press is
critical of any reports of rising crime and cynical of reports to the contrary. The police
do not need to be reminded of their duty to do all that is reasonable to prevent crime,
but the debate within society as to what is reasonable, including which databases
can be routinely accessed, rages on with opinion polls reflecting little more than
responses to the latest scandal.
With such a postulated sequence of events on the social and ethical implications
of using AI and Big Data in predictive policing, a number of drivers and inhibitors
have been identified. These are illustrated in Fig. 1 and explained further in later
sections.
204 K. Macnish et al.
Fig. 1 Drivers and inhibitors of predictive policing in 2025
3 Drivers to 2025
Various drivers have impelled the development of technologies used in predictive
policing in 2025, as depicted in Fig. 1 and discussed below.
3.1 Resources
Ever tighter squeezes on funding have led to a decline in the number of officers over
the past decade while investment in technology has increased. AI is often treated by
politicians as a panacea to limited public funds. There is some dissension in the ranks,
as many officers can see that while the police budgets are shrinking, the technology
firms developing AI applications seem to be thriving. If police budgets for human
resources have been declining, the quantity and quality of data processed by the
police have not. In fact, there is now so much data available from so many different
sources that the police would be overwhelmed were it not for artificial intelligence.
3.2 Public Perception
Given the increased data available, there is a concern that the police miss intervening
in cases where they had the relevant information in advance but did not process it in
time. This is widely seen as a dereliction of duty and one that no Chief Constable
wants to see on her watch. The public view of the police is ambiguous at best, and
there is a high level of expectation on the police and their use of technology. After
all, if a member of the public can prove that her stolen phone is in her neighbour’s
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house through using tracking apps like Prey, she wonders what there is to stop the
police from entering the home and retrieving the phone? Her reasoning leads her to
conclude that the police are either unwilling to help her or that they are hopelessly
out of date.
3.3 International and Technological Factors
As noted above, Europe has been less aggressive in employing predictive tech-
nologies than other countries, notably the US and China, which have considerable
resources and public support to invest in these technologies. Many European data
scientists have already migrated to one of these countries to work on systems that
European politicians see as being “too weak” to implement. These data scientists
opine that wemust followwhere technology leads and if it can help capture bad guys,
then you should use it. This divestment of talent, coupledwith themixed results of the
Horizon Europe research projects, has led some European police forces to buy tech-
nologies from US and Chinese companies, although they are uncomfortable with the
fact that these were likely developed in a manner not consistent with European law.
Furthermore, there is the ever-present fear that US or Chinese intelligence agencies
will infiltrate these systems through backdoors to spy on their European counterparts.
4 Inhibitors to 2025
While there have been several drivers pushing the development of predictive policing
technologies towards their current state in 2025, this development has not always been
straightforward. There have been barriers that impede progress. These are discussed
below.
4.1 Social Factors
Media coverage of increasing use of technology has rarely been positive and, while
the intended target was often politicians, it was the police who suffered from adverse
coverage. In particular, the press noted the lack of change in the demographics of
those arrested and imprisoned.While some have argued that a turn to computerisation
in detecting and predicting crime would lead to reduced discrimination, this appears
not to have been the case. Instead, data sets have been drawn from non-European
countries to ascertain norms, and parameters have been developed by computer scien-
tists unaware of European police priorities. At least one tool was developed in China
using a Chinese data set and drawing on factors that were culturally predictive in
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China but not Europe. This led to a significant rise in immigrant arrests for the trial
period when the application was first tested.
Even where the predictive capacities of the applications have been more effective,
these were met by the equal capacities of criminals who were able to emulate the
predictive tools and hack into them directly. This has become part of the continuing
escalation of methods used by the police and criminals to stay one step ahead of each
other. Most applications are in a constant phase of beta-testing as by the time they
are sufficiently stable to be rolled out on a wide basis their method has been cracked
and they are no longer as effective.
There has also been some marked resistance to change from within the police
forces themselves. This has largely been resolved through generational change as
the post-millennial generation who grew up on smart phones has come of age and
started to enter the workplace, but some resistance remains.
4.2 Economic Factors
Resources have been a driving factor in the development of predictive applications
but, paradoxically, they have also held back some aspects of development. There
has been a chronic shortage of computer scientists developing tools, and a shortage
of analysts with the abilities to effectively use those tools. This is largely due to
the inability of the public services to compete with private organisations, especially
those working in similar areas of technology in other countries. Limited funding
has also led to datasets and tools being less reliable than would be ideal, with the
result that their accuracy and efficiency sometimes leaves a lot to be desired. Despite
this, for some, an 80% conviction rate is good enough, and many are becoming
increasingly over-reliant on the systems that have led to a positive (although not a
virtuous) feedback loop.
4.3 Political Factors
The lack of funding is due to continued attempts to rein in public spending in the post-
2008 world. Some politicians worry about the press drubbing them and the police
for arresting people for crimes they haven’t committed yet. Some sceptics have
criticised the lack of effective and convincing metrics demonstrating the success of
the technologies.
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4.4 Legal and Regulatory Factors
To ensure accountability in the police use of data analytics and their databases, Parlia-
ment adopted laws and regulations that, among other things, made explainability
the default mode for algorithms. Politicians had to balance concerns about indi-
vidual privacy and data protection with the efficacy of police operations. The police
were concerned that excessive transparency would give criminals better insight into
police methods and, as it turned out, their concerns were justified. Consequently, a
committee of the European Parliament has been investigating and debating whether
algorithms developed for or used by LEAs should be compelled to have the same
standards as others if organised crime benefits from the tiniest scrap of information.
One solution to the stricter regulations imposed by Brussels and national govern-
ments on artificial intelligence has been the outsourcing of some technologies to
private companies. Google and Facebook have extensive databases of their users
and have on occasion helped the police in exchange for access to police databases.
Without such incentives, these companies only complied with the minimum require-
ments of the law, to the chagrin of many LEAs who believed these companies should
be doing more to help them in the fight against organised crime. The press saw this
outsourcing as having the effect of blurring the borders between policing and the
corporate world even more than was already the case in the early 21st century.
5 Postulated Impacts of Predictive Policing Technologies
In 2025, the benefits of predictive policing technologies are starting to be felt, even
though there is still considerable public discussion as to whether the benefits are
strictly attributable to the technologies or other factors. Nonetheless, their use has
been part of a marked shift in society and the number of impacts are noted as depicted
in Fig. 2.
5.1 Ethical Impacts
Older police officers resent the tighter constraints on their actions compared to when
they started their careers. They feel the so-called “smart” information systems that
tell them where to go and what to do, are undermining their own skills, experi-
ence and talents in responding to crime. Older policemen don’t seem to recognise
how organised crime has shifted away from street crime to more high-value crime in
money-laundering and cybercrime. At the same time, there is clearly greater account-
ability and transparency in policing as bodycams record every move of every officer
and individual officers are frequently held to account over why they did or did not
intervene in a particular situation.
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Fig. 2 Postulated impacts of predictive policing in 2025
Civil society organisations protest that predictive policing technologies are an
affront to Europeans’ fundamental rights. There is much debate within police ranks
and others about whether, when a police officer responds to an algorithm that has
80% predictive capabilities, she is infringing on a person’s civil rights by treating
him as a suspect on the basis of a statistical calculation rather than his doing anything
to warrant suspicion. At the same time, if she fails to act on the prediction, is she
thereby failing to uphold the civil rights of potential victims? This debate is ongoing.
More positively, prior to the implementation of predictive technologies, individ-
uals were already being stopped and searched, and arrested, sometimes for spurious
reasons. The aforementioned increase in accountability has shed light on discrim-
inatory stop-and-search practices. Overall, predictive policing technologies have
reduced some discriminatory practices and embedded others.
The public discussion that accompanied the widespread introduction of these
technologies helped ensure that the explainability regulations in Europe were fair,
ethical and sensitive to privacy concerns. Public pressures led to the establishment of
an independent oversight body to monitor police use of smart information systems.
While media attention has largely focused on the police use of predictive appli-
cations, some has focused on corporate responsibility. Since social media giants
collect reams of data, they are frequently able to identify child sex offenders or
people involved in domestic abuse. However, this information is rarely turned over
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to the police. Questions are being asked in national legislatures about the social
responsibility of these organisations.
5.2 Legal Impacts
A key problem with the development of legal and regulatory frameworks in keeping
up with technological development is that policy and lawmakers often do not under-
stand the technologies. Technological development is happening faster than the
passage of laws and has been impeded by the time lawmakers need to understand
recent developments and the subsequent legislative process. The GDPR, which came
into effect in 2018, remains generally fit for purpose regarding personal data, but with
the aggregation of databases it is increasingly rare to find data that cannot in some
context or manner be used to identify a living person. The most applicable legis-
lation for LEAs remains the Police Directive, which has meant that LEAs did not
need to seek informed consent when they were investigating persons of interest.With
so many AI-powered applications available online, prohibitions against automated
decision-making affecting the rights of data subjects have become impossible to
enforce except in a few high-profile cases like those against Google and Facebook in
2020–21. That so many enterprises see that it is impossible to enforce some provi-
sions of the GDPR has had the predictable consequence of diminishing respect for
the law even from law-abiding companies and citizens.
5.3 Social Impacts
Criminals seek advantage over LEAs by taking advantage of new technologies before
the police are able to put counter-measures in place. The nature of crime is changing.
There is a shifting focus from street crime, which is particularly subject to some of the
blunter forms of predictive policing technology, to organised crime and white-collar
crimes, including money-laundering, fraud, online scams and hacking.
While organised crime gangs are aware of predictive policing technologies, the
public generally has a low understanding of such technologies and their possible
negative impacts. The public is bombarded with so much information (and disin-
formation) about new technologies that it has become jaded. The powers of new
technologies have ceased to spark wonder. The majority of the public accept these
measures as just part of the cost of living. The public has already learned to cope
with substantial levels of surveillance in society—on the streets and in cyberspace.
Some people claim that they have altered their behaviour, to appear as conformist as
possible, as these days they do not knowwhat will land them in some police database.
“Better to play it safe,” they think.
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5.4 Economic Impacts
We have already noted the savage cuts in police budgets. Also of note is the shift
in budgetary priorities from police officers to more data analysts. As the number
of officers falls, so the reliance on AI grows, and as the reliance on AI grows, so
the same work (or at least similar) is apparently achieved with fewer officers, and
funding declines further. One solution has been to outsource certain tasks, such as
facial recognition, to the private sector, as the US has done for several years.
6 Mitigating the Negative and Accentuating the Positive
Influences of These Technologies
For some people, predictive policing was an easy sell. While civil liberty organisa-
tions still complain about the bias in algorithms, the public is wary—neither trusting,
nor distrusting, but conscious that crime rose several years in a row with cutbacks
on police officers. Predictive policing was touted as the artificial intelligence that
was going to make huge cuts in crime—which has not happened as organised crime
gangs have upped their game too.
Politicians, recognising the need to boost their trust with the public, agreed to
adopt a new regulation making algorithms explainable to the public. Each algorithm
was to include code saying who created the algorithm, who paid for it, its purpose,
website and contact for more information. This dispelled concerns about the police
wanting to keep their black boxes black, as it were, but led criminals to a better
understanding of police methods and tactics and a spate of hacking attacks on police
systems. Meanwhile, some “grey hat” hackers attempted to improve the algorithms
to help eliminate bias.
A significant factor in gaining public acceptance was the establishment of trusted
independent national bodies to oversee police use of algorithms in predictive tech-
nologies. Adequately funded, and staffed with known and respected figures such as
Baroness Lawrence in the UK, these independent bodies helped to build trust in the
police system. These bodies looked at not only the algorithms themselves but all
aspects of police use of data. They considered what data were collected, the purpose
of their collection, how the data were processed and storied, and their eventual usage
(including secondary use).
The findings of these bodies were, in the early days, significant in developing
crucial training programmes for the police about the new technologies and their
limitations. Politicians and senior police officials communicated these rules effec-
tively to the public. They hosted regular stakeholder engagement meetings with the
public to ascertain their concerns. Local police forces have also been hosting local
meetings with residents and community leaders to explain their use of new predic-
tive policing technologies, how these technologies were vital in offsetting the cuts
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in police staff numbers and, importantly, how accurate these algorithms were in
predicting criminal acts.
7 Steps Towards a Desired Future and Avoidance
of an Undesired Future
Civil society organisations, late-night talk-show hosts and some editorial writers
articulated fears that the new predictive policing technologies would yieldmany false
positives, that perfectly innocent citizens could be victimised by the new technologies
and placed on a police register without knowing why. There were worries about
positive feedback loops in particular locales targeted for attention, leading to a greater
number of arrests in these areas, leading in turn to algorithms predicting that these
were the areas on which the police should be concentrating. Had there been a blind
trust in the efficacy of the algorithms, then this may well have been the case, but
fortunately, this concern had been raised so many times that the police and algorithm
developers were on guard for such phenomena.
Addressing these concerns directly, by instituting transparency measures and
empowering oversight bodies, the police increased public trust and strengthened
social cohesion. Predictive policing technologies helped the police focus on previ-
ously invisible areas of crime. Data analysts uncovered these areas by training their
algorithms with masses of information from disparate sources. This allowed the
police to put more effort into tackling white-collar crime and online hate crime. This
in turn has had a ripple impact on international crimes such as people trafficking
and drug smuggling. In fighting such crimes, the police noticed positive effects in
communities that were otherwise subject to the attention of such smugglers. Crim-
inals and their would-be accomplices now recognise that if they commit a crime,
the likelihood of getting caught is higher than ever, even though there are lingering
worries about the inevitability of at least some false positives that could lead to the
harassment of innocent people [5].
The police also appreciated the new technologies as they found that effective
intelligence led to their approaching volatile situations with an enhanced awareness
of how those situations were likely to play out. These days, it’s rarely the case that
a police officer finds himself unexpectedly in the middle of a riot and fearing for his
life.
Predictive policing technologies have especially emphasised the prevention of
crimes—not only by minutes or hours but also on the factors that lead to criminality.
The initial emphasis on street crime led to an outcry by civil society organisations, the
media and citizens that such technologies were ignoring corporate crime which has
a much bigger impact on society. Always loving a challenge, data scientists recently
developed new smart information systems that are expected to enhance the detec-
tion of corporate crime and malpractices significantly. These new technologies are
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bringing ethicists and data scientists together, which is expected to benefit European
competitiveness greatly.
8 The SHERPA Project
This chapter is informed by the research and work conducted by the EU-funded
Horizon 2020 SHERPA project [9]. SHERPA is a collaborative research project that
was commissioned for 42months, beginning inMay2018, by theEU tobring together
a range of stakeholders to investigate, analyse and synthesise our understanding,
and to make recommendations to policymakers regarding ethical and human rights
issues raised by or likely to emerge from smart information systems, notably those
embedded with algorithms and artificial intelligence.
The above scenario was one of five developed in the SHERPA project. The
others concerned ‘deepfake’ technologies, information warfare, driverless vehicles
and robots in education. Each of the five followed the same structure and process
of engaging increasingly larger numbers of stakeholders. The five scenarios were
submitted to the European Commission in June 2019.
With policy scenarios, we do not aim to predict a specific future. That is impos-
sible. However, we can envisage a plausible future (the scenario) and the many
factors—the drivers, barriers, impacts—that policymakers should take into account to
enable or avoid a future like that envisaged in the scenario.We do not want a scenario
with many variables and possible turns of event. Policymakers prefer a clear, single
course of action that has stakeholder support. In addition to the structured approach
to its development, our scenario shows the range of factors that policymakers should
also take into account in the formulation of policy and recommendations.
One of the objectives of the scenario construction processwas to reach a consensus
on a plausible future. Participants were challenged to be creative, to leap ahead
six or seven years and imagine how the technologies might evolve and what new
applications might arise. The present often got in the way of the future in many of
the discussions, but mostly the present provided a reality check on a story-telling
exercise. We wanted more than the present, as it were, without getting trapped in
science fiction. We sought to develop plausible scenarios with recommendations that
would be useful for policymakers. The scenario construction process is a way for
policymakers to get “ahead of the curve”, to develop policies now that will anticipate
or pre-empt an undesired future and promote a desired future. In other words, the
policy development process needs to begin now, as it usually takes several years
before an identified policy requirement becomes legislation.
The scenarios were instrumental in spelling out ethical and social tensions and
their role in the current human rights framework. The scenarios were one of the
several methodologies that the SHERPA project used to understand and get to grips
with ethics and use of big data and AI. Others included:
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• Ten cases studies to explore the ethical and human rights tensions in different AI
and big data application domains [8].
• A large-scale online survey of 1,000 European citizens
• A Delphi study with 60 experts.
In these and other project methodologies, the partners sought to engage many
stakeholders [12].
9 Recommendations
Following the scenario on the social and ethical consideration of using AI and Big
Data in predictive policing, several recommendations are put forward. These are;
i. To boost their trust with the public, policymakers should adopt a regulation
making algorithms explainable to the public. Each algorithm should include
code recording who created the algorithm, who paid for it, its purpose, website
and contact for more information.
ii. Law enforcement authorities should ensure that criteria are clear and transparent
for personal data to be entered into law enforcement databases.
iii. Policymakers should ensure there are independent regulatory authorities of
sufficient size and clout to monitor the data in, and use of, law enforcement
databases, and offer commendations or impose penalties where appropriate.
iv. Decision-makers should ensure that measures in preventive policing and
community investment supplement developments in predictive policing.
v. Law enforcement authorities should take a balanced approach to local, white-
collar and online hate crimes.
vi. Law enforcement authorities should ensure effective training of police officers
and database operators regarding the limitations of data analysis, particularly
concerning the rates of false positives and automation bias.
vii. The EU should sponsor research on automatically detecting when an attack is
being planned and discussed.
10 Conclusion
As AI penetrates further into our economies and societies, it is speeding up decision-
making such that AI-powered decision-making becomes more needed. Human
decision-makers cannot respond fast enough, especially in the instance of attacks on
cities and critical infrastructure. AI-powered decision-making raises apprehensions
about decisions gone wrong or made without an appreciation of the consequences.
Our scenarios and the methodology we used to create them offer value to policy-
makers who wish to engage stakeholders in a structured process considering future
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developments and their ethical, legal, social and economic impacts. To our knowl-
edge, our structured approach to the scenario construction process is an innovation,
yet it flows logically from the development of new technologies and applications
to an illustrative vignette to the drivers, the inhibitors, and the ethical, legal, social
and economic impacts. The scenarios conclude with some recommended measures
to reach a desired future and avoid an undesired future. Our scenario construction
methodology is based on engaging with stakeholders from the get-go, from an initial
brainstorming workshop through several iterations of the scenario. Part of the reason
to invite increasingly greater numbers of stakeholders to review and comment on the
scenario is to prompt stakeholders to consider the implications of advanced new AI
technologies, the risks and benefits. In other words, construction of a scenario is also
an awareness-raising exercise. However, ultimately, a scenario is a policymaking
tool, and our scenarios are constructed in a way so that policymakers can readily
grasp their import and can use the scenario methodology themselves on other issues.
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